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Note
Jurisprudential Innovation or Accountability
Avoidance? The International Criminal Court
and Proposed Expansion of the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights
Kristen Rau∗
1

Atrocities of an international scale are nothing new. From
Carthage and Armenia to Rwanda and Iraq, the history of hu2
mankind features innumerable instances of horrific bloodshed.
Internationally-led individual criminal accountability for human rights abuses, by contrast, is a modern development. The
Nuremburg trials marked the earliest manifestation of international criminal proceedings, which have continued to evolve
with the establishment of the International Criminal Court
3
(ICC). Despite this changing face of international justice, the
controversy surrounding its utility—and whether it promotes
or compromises peace—is ongoing.
Given that Africa has a long history of human rights violations and that all seven of the ICC’s current active investiga∗ Juris Doctor candidate at the University of Minnesota Law School and
Master of Public Policy candidate at the University of Minnesota Hubert H.
Humphrey School of Public Affairs. The author would like to extend thanks to
Stephen Lamony of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court; Elise
Keppler of Human Rights Watch; Professor Duane Krohnke; Foreign, Comparative & International Law Librarian Mary Rumsey; Professor Kathryn
Sikkink; and Professor David Weissbrodt for their insightful comments and
edits. In addition, the author expresses thanks to Robert and Susan Rau for
their support. All errors herein are the author’s own. Copyright © 2012 by
Kristen Rau.
1. See generally BEN KIERNAN, BLOOD AND SOIL: A WORLD HISTORY OF
GENOCIDE AND EXTERMINATION FROM SPARTA TO DARFUR 1–40 (2007) (providing an introductory survey of human rights abuses throughout history).
2. Id.
3. Hon. Philippe Kirsch, President, Int’l Criminal Court, Keynote Address at the Judgment at Nuremberg Conference: Applying the Principles of
Nuremberg in the ICC (Sept. 30, 2006), available at http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ED2F5177-9F9B-4D66-9386-5C5BF45D052C/146323/
PK_20060930_English.pdf.
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4

tions are situated on that continent, it is unsurprising that African actors are vocal on international justice issues. It is
equally unsurprising that an African institution and its proposed expansion demonstrate the legal and political tradeoffs of
international justice efforts. The African Court of Justice and
Human Rights (ACJHR), a regional tribunal proposed by member states of the African Union (AU), is particularly controversial due to the uncertainty of its potential interaction with the
5
ICC. The ACJHR, as initially planned, merges two previous
regional courts into a single institution, combining judicial
functions related to state-level human rights violations and
6
treaty interpretation law.
Expansion of the court beyond that initial grant concerns
observers for several reasons. First, the proposed expansion of
the court would create the world’s first combined state-level
and individual-level criminal accountability mechanism for
7
human rights violations on an international scale. International criminal law and human rights law have long coexisted
in a bifurcated system of accountability, and observers fear that
8
their conflation is undesirable. Second, and perhaps more
problematically, expansion of the ACJHR would produce an area of overlapping jurisdiction between the court and the ICC
not contemplated by either court’s foundational document and
9
not definitively addressed in treaty interpretation law.
This Note investigates the ways in which modern developments in international criminal law interact with both longstanding and novel accountability institutions—specifically,
how proposed expansion of the ACJHR would relate to existing
systems of state- and individual-level accountability for human
rights abuses. Part I offers an overview of global judicial hu4. Karen L. Corrie, International Criminal Law, 46 INT’L LAW. 145, 151
(2012).
5. See Observations and Recommendations on the International Criminal
Court and the African Union, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 27, 2011), http://www
.hrw.org/node/99945.
6. African Union, Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights, art. 1 (July 1, 2008) [hereinafter ACJHR Protocol], available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/documents/treaties/text/Protocol%
20on%20the%20Merged%20Court%20-%20EN.pdf.
7. See Kathryn Sikkink, From State Responsibility to Individual Criminal Accountability: A New Regulatory Model for Core Human Rights Violations, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 121, 121–26 (Walter Mattli &
Ngaire Woods eds., 2009).
8. See infra Part II.A.2.
9. See infra Part II.B.1.
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man rights mechanisms, including the ICC and the ACJHR,
and discusses efforts to expand the latter’s jurisdiction. Part II
examines legal issues related to expanding the ACJHR’s jurisdiction, considers policy barriers to effectively prosecuting human rights abusers within the expanded jurisdictional scope,
and considers these challenges in light of potential benefits to
expansion. Part III suggests approaches through which stakeholders could address various procedural and practical difficulties should the AU pursue expansion. Ultimately, this Note
predicts that the ACJHR may well expand as the result of jurisprudential evolution and political will, suggesting that
stakeholders should recognize the potential benefits to expansion and develop benchmarks to ensure the court’s integrity
and effectiveness.
I. ALPHABET SOUP: AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND KEY PRINCIPLES
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS AND
THE EMERGENCE OF BIFURCATION
Modern human rights courts exist in a bifurcated judicial
10
system. That is, international courts and the nature of the
cases they hear vary widely depending upon a particular tribunal’s mandate to consider state- or individual-level human
11
rights claims. A brief history of these courts helps to contextualize the ACJHR and its proposed jurisdictional expansion.
In 1945, the field of human rights was basically unregulated; by 2000, states had ratified a panoply of human rights treaties and conventions, laying the groundwork for international
12
courts. In early regional human rights courts in Europe and
the Americas, the legal regulatory model focused only on states’
10. See generally KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN
RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 13–24 (2011).
11. See Sikkink, supra note 7, at 121–37 (examining the emergence of
state and individual accountability systems).
12. See id. Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms was adopted in November 1950, the American Convention on Human Rights was adopted in November 1969, and Africa’s Banjul
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted in June 1981. Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]; American Convention on
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter Inter-American Convention]; African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217.
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legal accountability for human rights violations. On the one
hand, then, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) hold accountable states whose action or inaction violates their residents’ human rights in contravention of states’ treaty obligations; these courts rule on the basis of human rights law
promulgated in the European Convention of Human Rights and
14
the American Convention on Human Rights, respectively.
Similarly, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decides ques15
tions of state-level violations under European Union (EU) law.
The United Nations’ primary judicial organ, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), also considers state-level human rights
16
claims. While the respective spheres of authority of these
courts relative to the others are not always clear, it is plain
that these courts consider only claims regarding state-level ac17
countability, rather than individual criminal accountability.
On the other hand, more recently formed ad hoc international criminal justice bodies like the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the permanent ICC
seek to hold individuals responsible, leaving state accountabil18
ity outside their legal competence. The ICC is perhaps the
most significant of these individual-level courts given its per19
manent status. The ICC has a mandate to hold accountable
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the inter20
national community. As an independent international organization (i.e., it does not operate as a direct part of the United
13. Sikkink, supra note 7, at 121.
14. Inter-American Convention, supra note 12, at arts. 61, 62; European
Convention, supra note 12, at art. 32.
15. See generally Court of Justice of the European Union, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm (last
visited Nov. 5, 2012).
16. See generally Rosalyn Higgins, Human Rights in the International
Court of Justice, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 745, 745–75 (2007).
17. See generally YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2003).
18. See Sikkink, supra note 7, at 134 for a discussion of key legal developments facilitating the evolution of an individual criminal accountability
model alongside state-level proceedings.
19. About the Court, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/
About+the+Court/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
20. Id. The ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity, referred to in this Note as “serious international
crimes.” This Note does not discuss the crime of aggression.
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Nations’ system), the ICC’s expenses are primarily funded by
21
members of its Assembly of States Parties (ASP). Since its
22
underlying Rome Statute entered into force on July 17, 1998,
the ICC has been at the center of robust debate about the utili23
ty and effectiveness of international justice mechanisms. The
Court concluded its first criminal trial of Thomas Lubanga in
24
August 2011. From its seat in The Hague, the ICC found the
former Congolese warlord guilty of using child soldiers in his
rebel army in 2002 and 2003, and sentenced him to fourteen
25
years in prison. The ICC reflects the increasingly prominent
individual criminal accountability paradigm, separate from
that aimed at state-level accountability. Indeed, observers consider the ICC’s underlying Rome Statute as “the clearest
statement of the new doctrine of individual criminal accounta26
bility.”
These courts—the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC—are the
product of work by human rights organizations, legal scholars,
and governments to facilitate the development of the individual
criminal accountability model through treaty language explicit27
ly referring to individual offenders. While the newer individual accountability model does reflect “an important convergence
[of several branches] of international law (human rights, humanitarian, and international criminal law) and domestic crim28
inal law,” it operates strictly independent of the state-level
21. See Gwen P. Barnes, The International Criminal Court’s Ineffective
Enforcement Mechanisms: The Indictment of President Omar Al Bashir, 34
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1584, 1593 (2011) (observing that the ICC is independent
from the UN).
22. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
23. For a discussion of the United States’ concerns about the ICC, see William A. Schabas, United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court:
It’s All About the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 701, 701 (2004).
24. Aaron Gray-Block, ICC’s Landmark Debut Trial Concludes After Two
Years, REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/24/uswarcrimes-lubanga-idUSTRE77N32N20110824.
25. Marlise Simons, Congolese Warlord Draws First Sentence From International Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 11, 2012, at A4.
26. Sikkink, supra note 7, at 136.
27. Id. at 134 (“The drafters of various treaties, especially the Genocide
Convention of 1948 and the Convention against Torture (CAT) negotiated in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, managed to insert clear references to individual criminal accountability. These treaties did not create a new legal framework
all at once, but rather contributed gradually and in an understated way to the
development of the new norms.”).
28. Id. at 137.
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model. Indeed, mechanisms for state-level violations and individual criminal accountability evolved during different periods
29
and emerged for different historical reasons. The state accountability model emerged alongside key treaties such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
as well as a proliferation of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and regional and international institutions overseeing
30
compliance with those treaties. These treaties and organizations emphasized states’ responsibility to protect human rights
31
and to investigate abuses of those rights. By contrast, the individual model ascended in the context of the Balkan conflict
and the Rwandan genocide, vivid illustrations that the domi32
nant state-regulatory model had failed. The individual model
“may have emerged as a way to provide additional enforcement
mechanisms for the human rights regime in the wake of the
perception that the current enforcement mechanisms were in33
adequate and new tools were needed.”
B. EVOLVING JURISDICTIONAL PARADIGMS: CONCURRENCE TO
COMPLEMENTARITY
Along with navigating the complexities of bifurcation outlined above, one of the thorniest challenges for promoting longterm peace in conflict states through judicial mechanisms is the
institutional relationship between international and domestic
29. Juan Méndez, Background Paper for Panel on Regional Organs of Protection, CONSULTATIVE CONF. ON INT’L CRIM. JUST., 2 (Sept. 9–11, 2009),
http://www.internationalcriminaljustice.net/experience/papers/session5.pdf.
30. Sikkink, supra note 7, at 123. The ICCPR, which entered into force in
1976, was the first U.N. multilateral treaty obligating states parties to respect
various enumerated rights of their citizens. International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
31. See Rhonda Copelon, International Human Rights Dimensions of Intimate Violence: Another Strand in the Dialectic of Feminist Lawmaking, 11
AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 865, 872 (2003) (“The ICCPR identifies two
concepts of state responsibility: the duty to respect (negative) or do no harm
and the duty to ensure (positive) the protection of these rights as against private interference as well as the means to exercise basic rights.”).
32. Sikkink, supra note 7, at 124.
33. Id. But see BEATRICE I. BONAFÈ, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE
AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 35 (2009) (“In
the less recent scholarship, the two regimes of international responsibility
were viewed as closely connected to each other. However, a gradual process of
separation took place until the rapid development of international criminal
law in the 1990s brought to the surface various practical issues concerning
their relationship.”).
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courts. The earliest ad hoc courts, such as the ICTY and the
ICTR, operated according to a principle of concurrent jurisdic34
tion. Effectively, this principle bestowed on international
courts the primary responsibility for investigating and prose35
cuting human rights abuses. According to their underlying
statutes, “[a]t any stage of the procedure, the International
Tribunal may formally request national courts to defer to the
competence of the International Tribunal in accordance with
the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of
36
the International Tribunal.” These international courts operated with precedence over the national courts; that is, these international courts were able to proceed with investigations and
prosecutions without determining that a domestic court had
37
failed to investigate or prosecute human rights violations.
Cognizant of the decimation of judicial systems of the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, drafters established primacy of the international courts in order to deal with hotly contested issues
38
in a more neutral and developed judicial environment.
Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which enjoyed jurisdiction in
effect superior to national courts, the ICC operates according to
39
a principle of complementarity. In a complementary relationship, as between the ICC and a domestic court, the former may
only step in where the latter is “unwilling or unable genuinely
34. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 348–51 (2003).
35. Id. In fact, the international tribunals could assert primacy in three
circumstances: when a national prosecutor investigated an international
crime, or a national court held criminal proceedings relating to that crime, as
an ‘ordinary’ and not an international crime; when a domestic court acted unreliably by showing partiality or dependence; or when the case was “closely
related to” other cases under consideration by the international tribunal. Id. at
349–50; see also ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 8-9, U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev. 46 (Oct. 20, 2011); ICTR, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 8-9,
U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev. 1 (June 29, 1995); John T. Holmes, Complementarity:
National Courts versus the ICC, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 667 (Antonio Cassese et al., eds., 2002).
36. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, art. 9, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; see also Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute].
37. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 52 (2010).
38. See CASSESE, supra note 34, at 349 (exploring the ways in which the
post-conflict context of Yugoslavia and Rwanda produced “the need . . . to affirm the overriding authority of the international Tribunal”).
39. CASSESE, supra note 34, at 351.
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to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” The historical
context in which the ICC emerged is significant: the International Law Commission’s preparation of the ICC draft statute
took place during its 1993 and 1994 sessions, after creation of
the ICTY and while the Security Council was concerned with
41
the Rwandan genocide. Drafters recognized both the need for
a permanent criminal court and states parties’ potential reluctance to sacrifice a role for their domestic courts in the investi42
gation or prosecution of suspected human rights crimes. The
Rome Statute’s inclusion of a complementarity approach, rather than a concurrency or primacy principle, recognized state
43
sovereignty and sought to manage scarce ICC resources.
Moreover, it signified an important and delicately negotiated
balance of state authority and international intolerance for im44
punity.
While these examples reflect a notable difference between
earlier tribunals and the ICC, the underlying statutes of all of
these courts feature a striking similarity: in determining the
ways in which they would interact with other courts (i.e., the
operationalization of their concurrent or complementary jurisdictional grant) all three courts contemplated only domestic
45
courts. The drafters of these courts did not consider regional
courts, such as the ACJHR, that might assert a shared jurisdic46
tional interest. The absence of relevant statutory language is
significant, as it leaves current international tribunals with little guidance on how they might interact with regional courts.
The novelty of the problem presented by potential ACJHR
expansion is revealed by a brief hypothetical comparison to the
ICTY. Although this situation has not presented itself, the
ICTY and the ICC conceivably could have overlapped jurisdictionally with regard to human rights abuses committed after
2002—a time still within the ICTY’s open-ended temporal ju47
risdiction, yet after the Rome Statute’s entry into force. The
40. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 17. An integral component of the
complementarity requirement concerns the point at which domestic proceedings are considered “unwilling or unable genuinely” to conduct an investigation or trial.
41. Holmes, supra note 35, at 670.
42. See CASSESE, supra note 34, at 351–52.
43. Id. at 351.
44. See id. at 351–53.
45. See infra Part II.B.1.
46. See infra Part II.B.1.
47. Michael Bohlander, Possible Conflicts of Jurisdiction with the Ad Hoc
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ICTY emerged pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
meaning that all U.N. members are bound to their obligations
to the tribunal above all other treaties and conventions, includ49
ing the Rome Statute. By contrast, the Rome Statute developed independently from U.N. membership, and its signatories
did not assume any obligations paramount to the United Na50
tions or its ad hoc courts. Because of its rooting in the U.N.
Charter, the ICTY’s authority would inherently have overruled
51
that of the ICC. The superior-subordinate relationship between the ICTY and ICC, though complicated and never pre52
sented, is a clear one.
By contrast, states parties to the Rome Statute would not
necessarily have a dominant obligation to the ICC over a regional court. This fact highlights the novelty of the issue posed
by potential jurisdictional expansion of the ACJHR in the context of the ICC: while the nature of past international tribunals
(e.g., the ICTY) inherently vested them with superior authority
to the ICC, such is not the case with the ACJHR and its proposed expansion. Identifying those portions of a shared legal
territory that would attach to the ICC and those that would attach to a jurisdictionally expanded ACJHR would not be
53
straightforward. Indeed, the absence of statutory guidance
that would resolve conflicts relating to overlapping jurisdiction
may lead to real legal conflict given the political and regional
interests existing at the intersection of international justice
and human rights.
C. A TIMELINE OF PAN-AFRICAN COURTS
The ACJHR constitutes a significant reorganization of
uniquely African justice mechanisms, a brief history of which is
International Tribunals, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
INAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, supra note 35, at 687–89.

CRIM-

48. ICTY Statute, supra note 36, at chapeau (“Having been established by
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations . . . [the ICTY] shall function in accordance with the provisions of the
present Statute.”).
49. Bohlander, supra note 47, at 688.
50. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 2 (noting that the ICC did not
emerge pursuant to U.N. authority and that any relationship with the United
Nations would exist by agreement only).
51. See id.
52. See Bohlander, supra note 47, at 688 (explaining that the ICTY’s jurisdiction would prevail over the ICC’s).
53. See infra Part II.B.1.
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54

useful. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(ACHPR) was established in 1998 with jurisdiction over all
members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), precursor
55
to the AU. Drafters vested the ACHPR with authority over
“all cases and disputes . . . concerning the interpretation and
application of the [OAU] Charter, this Protocol and any other
relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States con56
cerned.” In 2003, the AU adopted a protocol establishing the
organization’s principal judicial organ, the African Court of
Justice (ACJ), a second court with jurisdiction over all disputes
57
related to treaty interpretation and international law. These
two original courts, the ACHPR and the ACJ, featured nonoverlapping jurisdiction. While the former considered statelevel human rights issues, the latter was to address disputes
relating to general questions of international law, the validity
of AU treaties and subsidiary legal instruments, and acts, regu58
lations, and directives of AU organs.
AU leaders proposed the ACJHR in 2008, seeking to consolidate the two previous courts and merge their respective
59
functions into a single institution. As initially proposed, the
ACJHR would act as a dual-chamber court comprised of a Gen60
eral Affairs and a Human Rights Section. The ACJHR will
have sixteen judges, each appointed by a different state, with
61
three to four judges allotted to each region. As initially pro54. This Note focuses primarily on Pan-African courts (i.e., continent-wide
structures) rather than on regional or sub-regional courts.
55. See generally Nsongurua J. Udombana, Toward the African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late Than Never, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. &
DEV. L.J. 45 (2000).
56. Organization of African Unity, Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 3, CAB/LEG/665 (June 9, 1998), available at
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/courtestablishment/achpr_instr_proto_
court_eng.pdf (entered into force Jan. 1, 2004).
57. Compare id. at art. 3, with African Union, Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, arts. 2(2), 19(1) (July 11, 2003) [hereinafter ACJ
Protocol], available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/PROTOCOL_
COURT_OF_JUSTICE_OF_THE_AFRICAN_UNION.pdf (entered into force
Feb. 11, 2009).
58. ACJ Protocol, supra note 57, at art. 19(1).
59. ACJHR Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 2.
60. African Union, Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human
Rights, arts. 1, 16 (July 1, 2008) [hereinafter ACJHR Statute], available at
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/documents/treaties/text/Protocol%20on%
20the%20Merged%20Court%20-%20EN.pdf.
61. Id. at art. 3.
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posed, the ACJHR would be capable of hearing only two types
of cases: state-level accountability cases “relating to human
and/or [peoples’] rights” and cases related to the Constitutive
62
Act of the AU and other international or treaty law issues.
Notably, the ACJHR jurisdictional grant as initially proposed,
even without expansion, is far broader than that of the ECHR
or the IACHR. Because Article 28(c) gives the ACJHR jurisdiction over cases relating to “the interpretation and the application of the African Charter, the Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, or any
other legal instrument relating to human rights, ratified by the
States Parties concerned,” the ACJHR is the only court in the
world that would be able to enforce violations of treaties like
63
the ICCPR. Even under its original jurisdictional grant, experts worry that the court would suffer from an overextension
64
of responsibilities.
D. PROPOSED JURISDICTIONAL EXPANSION OF THE ACJHR
Recent proposals have pushed for the jurisdictional expansion of the ACJHR, a move that would challenge the bifurcated
international justice paradigm outlined above that separates
state- from individual-level accountability efforts. Proponents
argue that in addition to the dual-chamber jurisdictional grant
suggested in the ACJHR’s original underlying documents, the
ACJHR should also include a third chamber to consider individual-level criminal accountability for serious international
65
crimes.
62. ACJHR Statute, supra note 60, at arts. 17, 28.
63. ACJHR Statute, supra note 60, at art. 28(c) (emphasis added); see also
Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law:
The Politics of Distinction, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 299, 381 n.305 (2010) (“The
new [ACJHR’s] jurisdiction is set by Article 29 of the Statute in . . . incomparably broader terms, at least with regard to the Court’s sister regional human
rights courts in Europe and the Americas.”).
64. See Carlin Moore et al., International Legal Updates, 16 NO. 1 HUM.
RTS. BRIEF 33, 37 (2008) (noting ACHPR Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz’s concerns
that the merged court is ill-equipped to deal with its “impossibly broad” mission under the initial jurisdictional grant).
65. The merged court may be known as the African Court of Justice and
Human and Peoples’ Rights, but for the purposes of this article, I refer to it as
an expanded version of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights
(ACJHR). See Don Deya, Africa: Is the African Court Worth the Wait, OPEN
SOC’Y INITIATIVE FOR S. AFR. (Mar. 22, 2012), http://allafrica
.com/stories/201203221081.html.
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In February 2009, the AU Assembly issued a decision requesting the AU Commission and the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights to “examine the implications of the
Court being empowered to try international crimes such as
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes” and to re66
port to the Assembly in 2010. In July 2010, the AU Assembly
issued a second decision requesting the AU Commission to finalize its work on the implications of the jurisdictional expan67
sion. More recently, the AU Heads of State and Government
meeting at the 17th AU Summit adopted a decision encouraging “implementation of the Assembly’s Decisions on the
[ACJHR] so that it is empowered to try serious international
68
crimes committed on African soil.” As a result of these efforts,
the AU released an amended draft ACJHR protocol in May
2011 including proposed amendments, expressing formal support for the addition of an individual-level criminal chamber,
and articulating a plethora of crimes—including but not limited
to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide—of
69
which the chamber would be seized. In May 2012, African justice ministers and attorneys general approved the draft protocol for the extension of ACJHR jurisdiction to international
70
criminal jurisdiction. At the 19th AU Summit—hosted by
66. African Union, Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, at 1, Assembly/AU/Dec.213(XII) (Feb. 1–3, 2009), available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/
default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_1_3_FEBRUARY_2009_AUC_TWELFTH_
ORDINARY_SESSION_DECISIONS_DECLARATIONS_%20MESSAGE_
CONGRATULATIONS_MOTION.pdf. Shortly thereafter, the AU Assembly
issued a second decision pushing for “early implementation” of the February
2009 position. African Union, Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), at 1, Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev. 1 (July 1–3, 2009) [hereinafter African Union
Decision 245], available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBL
Y_EN_1_3_JULY_2009_AUC_THIRTEENTH_ORDINARY_SESSION_DECIS
IONS_DECLARATIONS_%20MESSAGE_CONGRATULATIONS_MOTION_0
.pdf.
67. African Union, Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, at 1, Assembly/AU/Dec.292(XV) (July 25–27, 2010), available at
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_25_27_July_2010_BCP_AS
SEMBLY_OF_THE_AFRICAN_UNION_Fifteenth_Ordinary_Session.pdf.

68. African Union, Decisions Adopted During the 17th African Union
Summit (July 1, 2011), available at http://www.au.int/en/summit/sites/default/
files/17th%20_SUMMIT_-_DECISIONS_DECLARATIONS_and_RESOLUTIONS__eng%20FINAL.pdf.

69. African Union, Legal/ACJHR-PAP/4(II)Rev.5, art. 14 (Nov. 13, 2011)
[hereinafter First Draft Amended ACJHR Protocol] (on file with author).
70. African Union, Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the
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Ethiopia after initially planned host Malawi vowed to arrest
Sudan President Omar Hassan al-Bashir pursuant to an ICC
71
warrant if he attended the Summit —the Assembly and the
Executive Council requested further information on the financial and structural implications of expansion for consideration
72
at the next summit in January 2013. Support for an expanded
court may be growing, and aspects of its proposed operations
are increasingly detailed.
Such a merged court—including chambers for treaty law,
state-level international human rights violations, and individual-level criminal international human rights violations—
would radically restructure judicial human rights accountabil73
ity efforts in light of the bifurcated structure of current courts.
Moreover, expanded ACJHR jurisdiction would overlap with
that of the ICC to include serious international crimes, a move
that could complicate already controversial international jus74
tice efforts.
The history and evolution of international human rights
courts reflect diligent efforts to increase accountability for hu75
man rights violations around the globe. Jurisdictional expansion could further these goals, constituting a natural (if revolu76
tionary) innovation in international law.
Alternatively,
expansion could undermine hard-won gains in the struggle
against impunity for a variety of reasons rooted in law and pol77
icy.

Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art. 3,
Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7 (May 15, 2011) [hereinafter Second Draft Amended ACJHR
Protocol] (on file with author); Letter from African Civil Society and International Organizations to Foreign Ministers on the 19th African Union Summit
(July 5, 2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/node/108800.
71. Malawi: Summit Meeting Declined, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2012, at A5.
72. African Union, Decision on the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, at 1, Assembly/AU/Dec.427(XIX) (July 15–16, 2012), available at http://www.au.int/en/
sites/default/files/Assembly%20AU%20Dec%20416-449%20%28XIX%29%20_E
_Final.pdf.
73. See infra Part II.A.2.
74. See infra Part II.B.
75. See generally SIKKINK, supra note 10, at 1–28 (noting the emergence
of justice norms after decades of efforts to increase accountability for human
rights violations, especially following World War II); Sikkink, supra note 7, at
121–22 (explaining that there has been a dramatic increase in international
regulation through the ratification of human rights treaties).
76. See infra Part II.A.1.
77. See infra Part II.B.
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II. THE JURISDICTIONAL EXPANSION DEBATE
ACJHR jurisdictional expansion, though not yet realized, is
78
nonetheless a contentious issue. Such a development would
potentially present benefits and drawbacks. In order to assess
the desirability of expansion, critics must engage with both
sides of the debate.
A. POTENTIALLY ATTRACTIVE ASPECTS OF EXPANSION
Expansion presents various theoretical advantages. First,
expansion may reflect the latest innovation in international
79
human rights law. A brief historical analysis supports arguments that such a development could continue an ongoing universal trend and, as such, novel legal advances in Africa should
80
be both expected and welcomed. Second, the proposed expansion would make the ACJHR the first and only international
court to combine state- and individual-level proceedings for
human rights abuses, a development that some observers be81
lieve would be both effective and efficient. Critics must consider these points as well as possible practical challenges in order to determine whether potential advantages would produce
actual benefits.
1. Jurisprudential Innovation
Jurisdictional expansion seems in many ways to reflect a
natural development in international law. Historically, geographic and sociopolitical forces combine to shape human rights
law in different ways at different times. Reference to the two
most visible regional legal systems for human rights investigations and court proceedings, Europe and Latin America, is par78. Compare Coal. for an Effective African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights [CEAC], et al., Implications of the African Court of Human and Peoples’
Rights Being Empowered to Try International Crimes Such as Genocide,
Crimes Against Humanity, and War Crimes: An Opinion, AFR. CT. COAL. 3
(June 2009) [hereinafter Implications], http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/
images/docs/submissions/opinion_african_court_extension_jurisdiction.pdf (describing the “insurmountable legal and practical obstacles” of expanding
ACJHR jurisdiction), with Jacob Lilly, Peace with Justice: Options for Bringing to Trial Human Rights Violators in Africa and a Proposed Solution to Cover the Gap in Enforcement Mechanisms Between International Criminal Law
and Human Rights Violations, 6 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 1, 30 (2002–03) (arguing
that expansion would be “the most effective and efficient solution to dealing
with human rights violators”).
79. See infra notes 82–94 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 82–94 and accompanying text.
81. Lilly, supra note 78, at 30–31.
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ticularly instructive. Europe, rocked by the unimaginable scale
of the Holocaust’s atrocities, effectively became a legal labora82
tory after the end of World War II. In addition to serving as
the seat of the Nuremburg trials in 1945 and 1946, European
states were among the strongest supporters of the 1948 Uni83
versal Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, European
states collaborated on the development of the European Con84
vention of Human Rights and its corresponding court in 1959.
Similarly, support for Latin America’s human rights commission and court in the 1970s and 1980s was a reaction to both
large-scale human rights abuses and increased democratization
85
across the region. Given this historical pattern in which legal
metamorphosis follows a period of large-scale human rights
abuse and/or the evolution of government, it may be natural to
expect that Africa will serve as the next laboratory for judicial
innovation unique to its own context. Indeed, this would not be
the first example of African jurisprudential innovation related
to human rights. The African Charter adopted in 1981, for example, for the first time combined the three so-called “generations” of human rights law—civil and political rights; social,
economic, and cultural rights; and a broad spectrum of selfdetermination, collective, environmental, and communication
86
rights—into a single binding instrument. Similarly, the 1977
African Unity Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism
in Africa predated the U.N. Mercenary Convention by twelve
87
years.
Looking to other areas of international human rights law
supports a position that the field of human rights is complex
and perpetually changing. For example, contemporary scholars
increasingly engage with the restorative aspects of human

82. Interview with Kathryn Sikkink, Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Dec. 14, 2011).
83. See GENE M. LYONS & JAMES MAYALL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF GROUPS 8 (2003)
(noting that the specter of the Holocaust played a part in shaping the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
84. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
85. See Klaas Dykmann, Impunity and the Right to Truth in the InterAmerican System of Human Rights, 7 IBEROAMERICANA 45, 45 (2007) (“Latin
America witnessed a practically institutionalised violation of human rights on
a large scale. However, from the early 1980s, the beginning of democratic
transition in the region led to an intense debate on impunity . . . .”).
86. Deya, supra note 65.
87. Deya, supra note 65.
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88

rights court proceedings, the growing influence of the “new in89
ternational judiciary,” or mainstreaming gender-sensitive ap90
proaches in post-conflict rule of law initiatives. It is noteworthy that the jurisdiction of the ACJHR criminal section would
include more crimes than are within the mandate of the Rome
91
Statute. The expanded ACJHR could presumably prosecute
individuals for crimes outside the purview of the ICC, such as
corruption, trafficking, the illicit exploitation of natural resources, money laundering and offenses committed by corporations; this fact suggests that the ACJHR could be seen as a bold
92
judicial response to a growing body of international norms.
Failing to acknowledge the dynamism of international human
rights jurisprudence ignores its status as a living, evolving
body of law.
In addition, it should be remembered that efforts to promote domestic (rather than ICC) authority over a particular
case are not per se undesirable. Facilitating the development of
domestic rule of law so that state-level courts are able to conduct investigations and prosecutions of crimes in the Rome
93
Statute’s scope is a goal of many civil society organizations
94
(though not the ICC itself, given its judicial mandate). Critics
88. See generally Thomas M. Antkowiak, An Emerging Mandate for International Courts: Victim-Centered Remedies and Restorative Justice, 47 STAN.
J. INT’L L. 279 (2011) (asserting that international courts are making progress
towards restorative justice and that a victim-centered model is attainable).
89. Yuval Shany, No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on
the Emergence of a New International Judiciary, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 73, 90
(2009).
90. See generally Eve M. Grina, Note, Mainstreaming Gender in Rule of
Law Initiatives in Post-Conflict Settings, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 435,
437 (2011) (arguing that cultural and religious gender issues are a significant
inhibitor to the success of international human rights laws and asserting that
“mainstreaming a gender approach in rule of law initiatives is crucial to longterm success”).
91. Second Draft Amended ACJHR Protocol, supra note 70, at arts. 28A,
46C.
92. Id.; see also supra note 72 and accompanying text; Escorihuela, supra
note 63.
93. For a definition of “civil society organization,” see Charles R. Ostertag,
Comment, We’re Starting to Share Well with Others: Cross-Border Giving Lessons from the Court of Justice of the European Union, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 255, 255 n.1 (2011) (“‘Civil society organization’ is an umbrella term that
includes nonprofit organizations, public charities, private foundations, and
nongovernment organizations, among others.”).
94. Marieke Wierda, Stocktaking: Complementarity, ICTJ BRIEFING: THE
ROME STATUTE REVIEW CONFERENCE 4 (2010), available at http://ictj.org/sites/
default/files/ICTJ-RSRC-Global-Complementarity-Briefing-2010-English.pdf;
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cannot discount jurisdictional expansion of the ACJHR merely
because it would produce a result different from the current regime. International jurisprudence is both fluid and dynamic,
meaning that novel developments in jurisdictional structure
are not necessarily flaws. Rather, observers must closely analyze expansion in principle and practice to determine whether
it would provide access to justice that is compliant with modern
international standards.
2. Revisiting the Bifurcated Human Rights Regime:
Conceptual Advantages to Institutional Unification of Stateand Individual-Level Proceedings and Practical Barriers
Expanding ACJHR jurisdiction would overturn the
longstanding bifurcation of state and individual accountability
95
for human rights abuses detailed above. At present, the structural separation of state and individual mechanisms is a key
96
element of accountability efforts for human rights abuses.
There is, however, significant conceptual overlap between the
97
regimes.
No court currently considers claims of human rights viola98
tions against both states and individuals. This dual-prong
system is indispensable to comprehensively addressing grave
99
human rights violations. Either regime alone is insufficient to
address the legal and social complexities produced by human
100
rights violations. If retaining both state- and individual-level
Christine Bjork & Juanita Goebertus, Note from the Field, Complementarity
in Action: The Role of Civil Society and the ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening
in Kenya, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 205, 213 (“The reality is that the
ICC does not have an explicit objective to actively participate in rule of law
strengthening; not only does the Court lack an express mandate to carry out
the functions of a development agency, but the States Parties are unlikely to
finance such direct interventions . . . . [The ICC] should primarily defer to domestic public and private actors to tailor their own rule of law strengthening
programs.”).
95. See supra Part I.A.
96. See supra Part I.A.
97. BONAFÈ, supra note 33, at 23–25.
98. See id. at 193 (“[O]ne of the clearest signs of the separation between
state and individual responsibility for international crimes is that there are
different and independent bodies charged with enforcing obligations of states
and obligations of individuals under international law.”).
99. See Sikkink, supra note 7, at 125 (“[T]he addition of individual criminal accountability alongside of the existing state accountability model means
that there is now significantly more enforcement of human rights norms than
existed previously.”).
100. See BONAFÈ, supra note 33, at 23 (“[I]t is undeniable that the commis-
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accountability in the human rights law system is important,
however, maintaining the institutional distinction between the101
se mechanisms may not be equally so.
Some commentators suggest that the current bifurcated
system is outdated and fails to adequately account for its conceptual overlap. For example, commission of a war crime could
produce responsibility at both an individual-level and a state102
level. The current bifurcated system, then, produces uncertainty about the interaction of regimes where such dual responsibility for a serious international crime is at issue. Critics
further note that strict bifurcation cannot address the nuances
of serious international crimes, such as those committed by col103
lective groups, rather than by individuals or the state.
In all likelihood, however, the institutional separation between state- and individual-level proceedings remains important. In part, the distinction is significant because the fundamental goals of state and individual accountability will not
always be complementary; indeed, at times they may work at
104
cross-purposes. Legal scholar Beatrice Bonafè notes the potentially irreconcilable goals of the two mechanisms: state-level
accountability is rooted in the doctrine of international legal
order, while individual-level accountability stems from a tradi105
tion of imposing legal obligations upon persons. State-level
accountability efforts can “fill the gaps that assignment of individual blame may leave in the processes of truth-telling and accountability and thus may serve to further reconciliation and
sion of international crimes entails a dual responsibility (of states and individuals).”).
101. Cf. id. at 194 (noting doubts about the “absolute separation between
state and individual responsibility for international crimes as far as enforcement mechanisms are concerned”).
102. Id. at 28 (“[A] dual responsibility for war crimes was, and still is, wellestablished under international law . . . .”).
103. Id. at 67 (observing that the current bifurcated structure fails to deal
adequately with collective crimes, i.e., those that are committed neither individually, nor at the state level); cf. Jelena Subotic, Expanding the Scope of
Post-Conflict Justice: Individual, State and Societal Responsibility for Mass
Atrocity, 48 J. PEACE RES. 157, 159 (2011), available at http://jpr.sagepub.com/
content/48/2/157.full.pdf+html (discussing the insufficiency of both individualand state-level accountability for mass crimes and calling for recognition of
another level of accountability: societal responsibility).
104. See Jocelyn Courtney, Note, Enforced Disappearances in Colombia: A
Plea for Synergy Between the Courts, 10 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 679, 680 (2010)
(noting that the ICC, an individual accountability court, and the IACHR, a
state accountability court, “fulfill different fundamental purposes”).
105. BONAFÈ, supra note 33, at 7.
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106

peace, the ultimate goals of transitional justice.” Conversely,
individual accountability personalizes the prosecution, conviction, and sentences for human rights violations, lifting the
107
“‘corporate veil’ of state responsibility.” The two approaches
“are difficult to reconcile, and they lead to diverging solutions
when applied to practical problems that arise from the rela108
tionship between state and individual responsibility.”
Post-apartheid South Africa serves as an example in which
post-conflict peace may not have been well-served by a dualpurpose court. The African National Congress (ANC) came to
power in South Africa in 1994 following the first election in
which all citizens of South Africa, including blacks, were free to
109
vote.
The formerly dominant and white-minority National
Party (NP) had not been militarily defeated, nor had it been exiled from South Africa. As a result, the ANC was not positioned
to unilaterally structure the transfer of power or to pursue ac110
countability of the former government at a state level. Rather, a negotiated transfer from the white NP to the ANC included the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
which established a framework that prioritized reconciliation
and reconstruction by allowing for amnesties in limited situa111
tions.
The limited amnesty system meant that individual
106. Saira Mohamed, A Neglected Option: The Contributions of State Responsibility for Genocide to Transitional Justice, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 327, 331
(2009).
107. Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, Union Internationale des Avocats, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25–28, 2009), in 103 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 441 (2009).
108. BONAFÈ, supra note 33, at 7.
109. See generally LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 241–
77 (rev. ed. 1995) (describing the end of apartheid).
110. Paul Lansing & Julie C. King, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission: The Conflict Between Individual Justice and National Healing in
the Post-Apartheid Age, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 753, 758–61 (1998).
Moreover, a state-level trial was not available in South Africa in 1994 because
no African regional court with the jurisdiction to conduct such proceedings
was available.
111. Id. Successful constitutional negotiations depended on making a deal
with the previous National Party regime, and Nuremberg-type individual trials were not an option if the ANC sought to promote stability and reconciliation. Paul Lansing & Julie King Perry, Should Former Government Leaders be
Subject to Prosecution After Their Term in Office? A Case of South African
President P.W. Botha, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 91, 98 (1999). Some observers argue that the use of limited amnesties and the consequent absence of widespread individual criminal trials in South Africa promoted stability and reconstruction. See John Dugard, Dealing with Crimes of a Past Regime: Is
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criminal trials proceeded only where human rights abusers
failed to apply for or obtain amnesty from designated amnesty
112
committees. Had a dual-purpose court existed in South Africa
in 1994, however, the determination to pursue this limited
number of individual criminal trials in place of a more comprehensive (and more controversial) state-level proceeding could
have sparked divisive political polemics, generated unrest, and
fatally undermined reconciliation efforts. The case of South Africa illustrates that the failure to maintain two unique systems
risks confounding international justice efforts. If state- and individual-level prosecutions were unified in a single institution,
decisions on the “track” that a particular case should follow
would be affected by political considerations, dramatically affecting the type and quality of relief available to victims. Ultimately, the structural distinction between state- and individual-level accountability preserves the integrity of the each
113
system’s goals. An institutional separation facilitates continuing efforts to serve the different and potentially inconsistent
114
goals pursued by each mechanism.
The current bifurcated system of accountability for human
rights abuses undoubtedly reflects various flaws, but the proposed ACJHR expansion is a remedy ill-suited to the problem.
As the international legal community increasingly recognizes
the overlap between the individual- and state-level regimes, it
Still An Option?, 12 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1001, 1010–11 (1999) (“Amnesty was
one of the most difficult issues that faced negotiators after the abandonment of
apartheid. Prosecution à la Nuremberg that had been threatened by the
[ANC] while engaged in the armed struggle was clearly impossible in a situation in which there was no victor. On the other hand, absolute, unconditional
amnesty, of the kind favoured by the retiring apartheid regime, was unacceptable to the ANC. The compromise was conditional amnesty . . . .”); id. at
1015 (“The present state of international law on the issue of amnesty is, to put
it mildly, unsettled . . . . This uncertainty has a major advantage: it allows
prosecutions to proceed where they will not impede peace, but at the same
time permits societies to ‘trade’ amnesty for peace where there is no alternative.”).
112. Dugard, supra note 111, at 1012.
113. BONAFÈ, supra note 33, at 216–17 (“When no separation exists between the body charged to deal with state responsibility and that exercising
criminal jurisdiction over the individuals responsible for international crimes,
there is the risk that the basic principles of international criminal law may be
frustrated . . . .”).
114. See Méndez, supra note 29, at 6 (“International criminal tribunals
should never overstep their boundaries and condemn States for the abuses
committed by individuals; likewise, organs whose jurisdiction is limited to
State responsibility should not engage in determinations of liability of individuals.”).
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will have to conceptually revisit this bifurcation and collectively
address the best means for imbuing the ICC with flexibility to
adapt to changing opinions of the legal community and the
evolving face of human rights violations. By merely patching
together state and individual accountability into a single institution, however, the ACJHR’s proposed expansion would produce a jurisprudential hodgepodge, rather than streamlined
justice. While individual- and state-level systems undoubtedly
and necessarily interrelate, and while the current structure
fails to recognize this interaction adequately, the goal should be
to coordinate them rather than to merge them into a single in115
stitution.
B. A CRITIQUE OF EXPANDED ACJHR JURISDICTION ROOTED IN
LAW AND POLICY
A comprehensive appreciation of the implications of expanded jurisdiction requires consideration of legal hurdles and
policy-based obstacles. First, the absence of statutory guidance
in the Rome Statute or the ACJHR’s underlying documents
means that interaction of overlapping courts would be difficult
to articulate. Second, ACJHR expansion may frustrate the
goals of complementarity painstakingly laid out in the Rome
Statute: to promote state-level rule of law and to ensure that
court decisions are not politicized. Finally, an expanded court
might face myriad practical challenges to operating in compliance with globally accepted legal standards.
1. Treaty Interpretation and the Lack of Statutory Basis in
the Rome Statute and the Protocol on the Statute of the
ACJHR
The most obvious challenge to facilitating interaction of the
ICC and the jurisdictionally expanded ACJHR stems from the
complete absence of statutory consideration of the courts’ potential jurisdictional overlap. Given the absence of any binding
text on the subject, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides a helpful starting point to determine the
ways in which the ICC and an expanded ACJHR might interact
116
(or fail to do so effectively).
115. Courtney, supra note 104, at 703 (noting that the goals of individual
and state-level accountability mechanisms are both important, and that these
institutions should develop “synergetic” relationships).
116. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states that a treaty
must be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
117
context and in light of its object and purpose.” The statutory
language, then, provides a starting point. Unfortunately, the
ACJHR’s underlying documents offer little clarity on the issue
of complementarity. Indeed, the initial ACJHR protocol asserted that the court “shall have jurisdiction over all cases and all
legal disputes submitted to it” falling within several categories,
declining to detail how concurrent or overlapping jurisdiction
would affect the court’s authority to pursue investigations or
118
cases also pending before the ICC. Recent developments further suggest that ACJHR supporters have expressly avoided
confronting the issue of overlapping jurisdiction with the ICC.
The 2011 draft protocol incorporating proposed amendments
would expressly limit ACJHR admissibility determinations,
which relate to whether a case may be heard by the court at all,
to only those situations where a “state” has commenced inves119
tigation.
Moreover, the document specifies that “[the
ACJHR], the Courts of African Regional Economic Communities as appropriate, and the national Courts of States Parties
shall have concurrent jurisdiction over the crimes identified by
this Protocol and Statute,” conspicuously omitting reference to
120
the ICC.
The 2012 proposed amendments to the ACJHR
Statute again noticeably failed to address the relationship between an expanded ACJHR and the ICC by omitting reference
to the latter in Article 46H on Complementary Jurisdiction, re121
sulting in an ongoing absence of clarity on the subject.
Similarly, the ICC’s Rome Statute offers little clarity on
whether or how the court’s complementarity principle would
122
operate with a regional-level court. Both the preamble to the
117. Id.
118. ACJHR Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 28. Article 27 of the same protocol reminds the ACJHR to “bear in mind the complementarity it maintains
with the African Commission and the African Committee of Experts,” but
omits reference to the ICC. Id. at art. 27.
119. First Draft Amended ACJHR Protocol, supra note 69, at art. 46H(2).
120. Id., at art. 46H(1).
121. Second Draft Amended ACJHR Protocol, supra note 70, at art. 46(H)
(“The jurisdiction of the Court shall be complementary to that of the National
Courts, and to the Courts of the Regional Economic Communities where specifically provided for by the Communities.”).
122. Article 7 of the Genocide Convention provides that any person charged
with genocide “shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal
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Statute and Article 1 mention the court’s complementarity
123
principle relative only to “national criminal jurisdictions.”
Moreover, the court’s admissibility criteria relating to complementarity limit eligible cases to situations where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely
to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) The case has been
investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State
has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to
124
prosecute . . . .

Had drafters of the Rome Statute contemplated its interaction with an overlapping regional court, it is likely that the instrument would have expressed its jurisdictional scope with
reference to regional as well as domestic mechanisms. There is
little question that the Rome Statute intended the principle of
complementarity to apply to domestic, rather than regional,
125
courts. In order to remedy that omission, states parties to the
Rome Statute would likely have to initiate the cumbersome
process of approving a statutory amendment that would expand
the ICC’s complementarity principle to competent regional bod126
ies with individual criminal justice chambers. Of course, even
in the absence of an actual amendment, the ICC Office of the
Prosecutor could independently determine under Article 53 of
the Rome Statute if the existence of a regional prosecution
means that there is no “reasonable basis to proceed” with ICC
127
prosecution. Quite clearly, however, informal action on the
as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall
have accepted its jurisdiction.” Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, art. 6, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. An expanded
ACJHR, though a regional court, could be interpreted as one such “international penal tribunal” only by stretching the definition of that term far beyond
its original intended scope. For a counterargument, see Chacha Bhoke
Murungu, Towards a Criminal Chamber in the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1067, 1081 (2011).
123. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at pmbl., art. 1.
124. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 17.
125. See generally Wierda, supra note 94 (highlighting that the Rome Statute did not anticipate a role for regional courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over crimes that could be tried at the ICC or at the domestic level and clarifying that the Rome Statute assigns that responsibility to domestic legal systems).
126. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 121(4) (“[A]n amendment shall
enter into force for all States Parties one year after instruments of ratification
or acceptance have been deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations by seven-eighths of them.”).
127. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at arts. 17, 53. That is, the OTP could
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part of the OTP could invite suspicion of bias, and statutory
texts of the ICC and the ACJHR are the most authoritative
sources for recognition and discussion of overlapping criminal
jurisdiction.
That said, the absence of explicit engagement in the courts’
underlying statutes and protocols prompts consideration of unofficial, yet instructive, sources of guidance. Rome Statute
drafters at no time considered that the complementarity regime
they designed would apply to regional human rights courts con128
sidering cases of individual criminal accountability. Indeed,
International Law Commission (ILC) commentary on a 1994
draft of the Rome Statute reflects that the complementarity
principle was intentionally limited in scope to national
129
courts.
Opponents of expansion worry that perpetrators of alleged
human rights abuses in Africa could use this confusion to assert jurisdiction over issues pending before the ICC, hoping to
resituate investigations and cases in a nascent and under130
funded institution to avoid accountability. For example, Article 30 of the Vienna Convention suggests that where two successive treaties relate to the same subject matter (as would be
the case should the ACJHR’s underlying protocol and statute
be properly amended to include a criminal chamber for serious
international crimes), states parties to both treaties would be
bound to their Rome Statute obligations “only to the extent that
131
its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.”
Efforts to strip the ICC of jurisdiction via this mechanism
would likely prove ineffective; however under Article 127 of the
exercise its authority under Article 53 to apply the criteria of Article 17 to an
evaluation of proceedings in a regional institution. Lutz Oette, The Repercussions of the al-Bashir Case for International Criminal Justice in Africa and
Beyond, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 345, 363 (2010).
128. Sharon A. Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 17: Issues of Admissibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 605, 613 (Otto
Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008).
129. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fortysixth Session U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994),
reprinted in [1997] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 27, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1994/Add.1 (Part 2) (“The emphasis [in the Rome Statute] is thus on the court
as a body which will complement existing national jurisdictions . . . .”).
130. See, e.g., AU Hostility Threatens International Justice, KENYAN SECTION INT’L COMMISSION OF JURISTS (May 31, 2011), http://icj-kenya.org/index
.php/media-centre/commentary/362-au-hostility-threatens-internationaljustice [hereinafter AU Hostility].
131. Vienna Convention, supra note 116, at art. 30.
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Rome Statute, a state party could not avoid its obligations related to cases or investigations commenced prior to the date of
132
effective withdrawal from the Statute. Moreover, because the
Security Council is empowered to refer situations to the ICC
under Article 13(b), U.N. member states would be obligated to
assist in the investigation of cases and the prosecution or transfer of suspects, regardless of the states’ status as signatories or
133
non-signatories to the Rome Statute. That is, African states
that are U.N. members would be obligated to assist with ICC
proceedings to some extent, irrespective of the responsibilities
they assume by virtue of a new relationship with the ACJHR.
Despite the ICC’s ability to retain investigations and cases currently underway, expansion opponents rightly note that the
lack of statutory language creates ambiguity that could be opportunistically exploited to undermine ICC efforts and political
support for the court. Moreover, confusion persists regarding
the interaction of the courts with potentially overlapping jurisdiction in future, rather than ongoing, cases.
2. Frustration of the Purpose of Complementarity: Diverting
Attention from Domestic Rule of Law Development and Risking
Politicized Judgments
Complementarity relates closely to the integrity of domestic legal systems. Drafters of the Rome Statute considered it
preferable to leave the majority of cases concerning international crimes to national courts, which would likely have great134
er capacity to collect evidence and apprehend the accused.
Early Rome Statute supporters also saw rule of law promotion
as a desirable (if secondary) effect of including the principle of
135
complementarity.
132. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 127(1)–(2). Effective withdrawal
requires a State Party to notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations in
writing of its intended withdrawal, after which time withdrawal takes effect
one year after the date of receipt of the notification unless the notification
specifies a later date.
133. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 13(b); see also Stephane Bourgon,
Jurisdiction Ratione Loci, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, supra note 35, at 559, 565 (“[W]hether or
not the State on whose territory the crime was committed or the State of nationality are Parties to the Statute has no bearing on the powers of the Security Council under this provision.”).
134. CASSESE, supra note 34, at 351; Williams & Schabas, supra note 128,
at 609.
135. Cf. Rosanna Lipscomb, Restructuring the ICC Framework to Advance
Transitional Justice: A Search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan, 106
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Domestic rule of law carries independent significance for a
variety of reasons. Scholarly research reveals that rule of law is
136
“strongly correlated” with life expectancy. Moreover, government agencies have recognized the relationship between rule of
137
law and economic growth. The ICC is not itself responsible—
and should not be—for actively developing the legal systems of
138
states in which its investigations are ongoing. This responsibility falls largely to civil society organizations and states
139
themselves. The strong conceptual connection, however, remains between the promotion of state-level rule of law and the
ICC. If complementarity in part aims to promote the growth of
national rule of law, diverting cases and resources to a regional
court would serve different purposes. Development of regional
rule of law at the expense of state rule of law may not produce
positive effects in health and investment measures, because
any effect would exist in a continent still governmentally divided into states. There is little support for the position that improved regional rule of law would translate into better and
more effective state policies, which is at least an ancillary goal
140
of Rome Statute complementarity.
Moreover, shifting the
onus for rule of law from states to institutional bodies abdicates
a responsibility fundamental to the international system, as
“the exercise of national criminal jurisdiction is not only a right
141
but also a duty of States.” Mere substitution of a regional
COLUM. L. REV. 182, 183–84 (2006) (“Tracing developments from the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals, purely international in character, to the introduction of principles of complementarity in the ICC [on onwards] . . . an obvious
trend emerges. Ultimately, the international community recognizes that there
can be no substitute for serious efforts to strengthen the rule of law domestically.”).
136. Peter Boettke & J. Robert Subrick, Rule of Law, Development, and
Human Capabilities, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 109, 117 (2003).
137. See, e.g., Safety Security and Accessible Justice: Putting Policy into
Practice, DEPARTMENT FOR INT’L DEV. 14 (2002), http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/
SSAJ23.pdf.
138. See Wierda, supra note 94, at 4.
139. See id. For an interesting analysis of the paradox presented by the involvement of civil society in promoting domestic judicial capacity as they advocate for ICC involvement, see Bjork & Goebertus, supra note 94, at 205–29.
140. Bjork & Goebertus, supra note 94, at 212 (“The ICC Chief Prosecutor
has stated that one of the objectives of his office is to encourage and facilitate
states in investigating and prosecuting crimes domestically . . . .”).
141. Williams & Schabas, supra note 128, at 607 (quoting Office of the
Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before
the Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT., 5 (Sept. 2003), http://www.icccpi
.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Policies+an
d+Strategies/Paper+on+some+policy+issues+before+the+Office+of+the+Prosec
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court for a domestic court in the Rome Statute’s complementarity scheme is not a solution to the problem discussed herein
because it fails to account for the unique benefits of promoting
domestic rule of law.
Further, critics note that effective individual human rights
prosecutions require a court to remain impartial, but they also
demand that the court “understand the reality within which [it]
142
work[s] to be relevant and effective.” Domestic tribunals are
naturally exposed to this relevant contextual information. An
expanded ACJHR, geographically and operationally distinct
from the situs of the crimes it would consider, could result in
remoteness undermining its effectiveness.
Similarly, complementarity in practice is essential to
avoiding politicized judgments and compromised judicial credibility. Unlike the ECHR, which evolved alongside political organs and entities in Europe, the expanded ACJHR is a “late143
comer to a scene with highly developed political organs.”
Because the ACJHR’s expansion would require a political decision by the AU, it takes little imagination to recognize that subjecting a court to State determinations regarding its jurisdiction “will have a very negative effect over its real or perceived
144
independence and impartiality as a court of law.”
In addition, given the lack of clarity regarding potential jurisdictional overlap should the ACJHR expand, conflict could
easily erupt over which court—the ICC or the ACJHR—would
have jurisdictional precedence in an investigation or case. Such
a conflict has the potential to compromise the legitimacy of
both courts by risking light sentences, weak enforcement, un145
warranted acquittals, or politicized benches.
Even if the
Rome Statute contemplated regional-level complementarity,
exercises of overlapping jurisdiction could create conflict between institutions and produce proceedings that are actually
utor.htm).
142. James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional
Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the InterAmerican Court, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 768, 770 (2008).
143. Thompson Bobby Ugiagbe, The African Court of Justice and Human
Rights: Future Political and Jurisdictional Realities and Challenges, PEACE &
CONFLICT MONITOR (May 3, 2010), http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive
.cfm?id_article=714.
144. Méndez, supra note 29, at 6.
145. Kate Gibson, An Uneasy Co-existence: The Relationship Between Internationalised Criminal Courts and Their Domestic Counterparts, 9 INT’L
CRIM. L. REV. 275, 277 (2009).
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politicized or perceived as such. Moreover, overlapping jurisdiction can produce uncertainty for victims, defendants, and pros146
ecutors of international crimes or result in forum-shopping by
147
the accused. A lack of clarity about institutional interplay
could thus seriously compromise the ACJHR’s ability to fulfill
148
its expanded mandate (or its existing one).
3. Practical Difficulties of Concurrently Operationalizing a
Tri-Chamber Court
While some argue that a court with jurisdiction over both
states and individual actors could deliver a more comprehen149
sive package of justice, in reality the ACJHR likely lacks the
fundamentals to execute an expansion and still deliver due pro150
cess because of inadequate capacity and political will. First,
146. There is some evidence that parallel judicial structures can result in
double jeopardy prosecutions in violation of the ne bis in idem principle. ORG.
FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR., Report 9—On the Administration of Justice, 7–8 (Mar. 2002) [hereinafter Report 9], available at http://www.osce.org/
kosovo/12561. For a discussion of ne bis in idem in international criminal law,
see Ildikó Erdei, Cumulative Convictions in International Criminal Law: Reconsideration of a Seemingly Settled Issue, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV.
317, 319–20 (2011) (“The principle of ne bis in idem is referred to in common
law jurisdictions as the prohibition on double jeopardy. Double jeopardy is
thought of as applying to repeated trials within the same jurisdiction, whereas
ne bis in idem is broader, protecting ‘the person from repeated prosecution or
punishment for the same conduct, irrespective of the prosecuting system.’”
(quoting Arrila Bogdan, Cumulative Charges, Convictions and Sentencing at
the Ad Hoc International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 3
MELB. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 n.17 (2002))).
147. Gibson, supra note 145, at 276–77.
148. See supra notes 6 3 –64 and accompanying text.
149. Lilly, supra note 78, at 30–31. Supporters of expansion also assert that
proceedings relating to African violations should be investigated and prosecuted on the African continent. Harvard University Hauser Center, Domestic and
Regional Complementarity, YOUTUBE (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=ifgXxa2Q1FI. This purely geographic argument is not convincing in the context of the ACJHR, however, because the ICC expressly provides
for in situ proceedings (though these have yet to occur). Rome Statute, supra
note 22, at art. 3(3).
150. See Implications, supra note 78, at 3 (noting that the proposal to expand ACJHR jurisdiction “confronts insurmountable legal and practical obstacles”); see also Ibrahim Kane & Ahmed C. Motala, The Creation of a New African Court of Justice and Human Rights, in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986–2006, at 428 (Malcolm
Evans & Rachel Murray eds., 2d ed. 2008) (“It would be a serious mistake for
the Assembly to confer on the Court of Justice and Human Rights jurisdiction
to conduct criminal trials, since the structure, composition and resources . . .
would not permit it to conduct such trials. Furthermore, given that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been established and many AU Member
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critics doubt the AU’s ability to design and implement an expanded jurisdictional grant to the ACJHR, particularly because
of its likely high cost and the limited resources already allotted
151
to the court. Courts will require extensive training in the
rights of victims, witness protection arrangements, compliance
with court decisions, outreach efforts, evidence collection and
152
preservation, and defendants’ rights. According to a coalition
of NGOs and human rights advocates, the financial implications of these requirements will be “exponentially onerous and
[will] call into question the desirability and effectiveness of the
153
process.” African states themselves have noted the chilling
effect that inadequate financial resources can have on justice
154
efforts. Within the context of an expanded ACJHR, such a
chilling effect is likely given the estimated average multimillion dollar cost for a single trial of an international crime in
155
Ultimately, funding limitations
an international tribunal.
could seriously compromise the mandate of the ACJHR in its
work relating to treaty interpretation and state-level human
rights claims, not only that connected to individual criminal accountability.
The effects of restricted funding may be amplified by capacity limitations. Jurisdictional expansion would require both
administrative and structural changes to the ACJHR. With an
expanded court must come detention facilities, a criminal appeals chamber, and accommodations for inter-state actions reStates have ratified the Rome Statute establishing this Court, all attempts
should be made to strengthen the ICC, instead of having a proliferation of
criminal trials in different parts of the world.” (footnote omitted)).
151. Implications, supra note 78, at 16–17; see also AU Hostility, supra
note 130 (describing a meeting of African and European civil society questioning the ACJHR’s technical and financial capacity to run a separate criminal
jurisdiction outside of the ICC).
152. Implications, supra note 78, at 14 –16.
153. Id. at 15.
154. See Lubuto v. Zambia, No. 390/1990, ¶ 5.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/
390/1990 /Rev.1 (1995) (asserting that country in a “bad economic situation,”
such as Zambia, lacked the financial resources to adequately adjudge cases).
155. See David Wippman, The Costs of International Justice, 100 AM. J.
INT’L L. 861, 862 n.11 (2006) (observing that, as of 2006, dividing the ICTY
budget by the number of trials concluded indicates that $18 million dollars
were spent per trial, though this figure failed to take into account the costs of
proceedings against indicted but ultimately untried individuals or the costs of
cases then in progress); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY:
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 190 (2011) (reflecting official website content from the ICTY and the ICTR that the average per
case costs are $10–$11 million and $11 million, respectively).
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lated to the apprehension and transfer of suspects. In addition, the ACJHR’s judicial bench would be entirely new if the
sitting bench of the ACHPR is dismissed prior to ACJHR empaneling as planned; whether in its initially proposed or an expanded form, the court risks loses valuable institutional
157
memory that will need to be rebuilt. The capacity of AU
states to meet these challenges is open to question given many
members’ ongoing failure to ensure that independence and due
158
process are guaranteed by their domestic courts.
Indeed,
ACHPR Judge Fasah Ouguergouz has noted the critical absence of respect for judicial culture at both the municipal and
159
continental levels in Africa. The financial resources and capacity of AU member states cast doubt on the likelihood of
timely and lasting effectiveness from an expanded ACJHR;
these doubts are further amplified given states’ willingness (or
lack thereof) to consistently commit to efforts that protect human rights.
Examples abound of insufficient political willingness in the
AU and the consequent compromised effectiveness of AU hu160
man rights institutions. The byzantine judicial maze of African judicial accountability systems outlined above is complicated by delays related to the establishment and
operationalization of the ACJ, the ACHPR, and the ACJHR.
The ACHPR, for example, did not deliver its first judgment
from its seat in the Tanzanian city of Arusha until December
161
2009, and the ACJ has yet to hear any case. The ACJHR does
156. See Implications, supra note 78, at 18 (noting that an expanded
ACJHR would have to rely on cooperation from states to enforce its orders and
assist in investigations).
157. See Advocacy Before Regional Human Rights Bodies: A Cross-Regional
Agenda, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 163, 244 – 45 (2009) [hereinafter Advocacy Conference] (noting comment of ACHPR Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz that “the judges
of the current [ACHPR], the bench of the current Court, including myself, will
be ‘resigned’—or, in other words, will be dismissed. So there will be a totally
new court which is going to be established, creating some very important and
crucial issues of judicial legacy”).
158. See, e.g., Abdoulaye Massalatchi, Niger Leader Dissolves Constitutional Court, REUTERS (June 29, 2009, 9:50 PM GMT), http://af.reuters.com/
article/nigerNews/idAFLT50531820090629.
159. Advocacy Conference, supra note 157, at 255 (“But what is missing [in
Africa] is a ‘judicial’ culture, both at the continental level and at the grassroots, municipal level. There is no respect for judges at the national level.
Most of the African states do not really consider the decisions or the rulings of
the judges.”).
160. Kane & Motala, supra note 150, at 438–39.
161. Michelot Yogogombaye v. The Republic of Senegal, Application No.
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not yet even functionally exist; as of September 2012, only five
states have ratified its underlying protocol, notably short of the
162
fifteen it requires to enter into force. Commentators have further noted that the precipitate subsuming of the ACHPR within the ACJHR “does not seem to bode well for the project of es163
tablishing a strong African human rights court.”
Other examples of inadequate political will result from
more explicit structural choices. For example, not all entities
and individuals have access to the remedies that the ACJHR in
its initial or its expanded form would offer. The most recent
proposed amendments to the ACJHR, which would facilitate its
jurisdictional expansion, reflect a notable limitation on those
persons and entities eligible to submit cases to the Court. According to those changes,
African individuals or African Non-Governmental Organizations with
Observer Status with the African Union or its organs or institutions
[are eligible to submit cases to the Court], but only with regard to a
State that has made a Declaration accepting the competence of the
164
Court to receive cases or applications submitted to it directly. . . .

The significance of this language is that it severely limits
the ability of individuals and many NGOs to submit complaints
directly to the Court, because states that become ACJHR members need not automatically subject themselves to individuals’
standing before the Court. By contrast, an important feature of
jurisdiction in the ECHR, a predecessor and peer of the
ACJHR, is the eligibility of individuals to submit complaints
165
directly to the court for investigation.
Drafters of the
ACJHR’s underlying documents, though presented with “an
opportunity for remedying a critical failure,” declined to expand
the limited grounds for standing before the court to include in166
dividuals.
One critic observes, “the limited standing [ob001/2008, African Court of Human Rights (2009).
162. List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, AFRICAN UNION,
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/documents/treaties/list/Protocol%
20on%20Statute%20of%20the%20African%20Court%20of%20Justice%20and%
20HR.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
163. See RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 408 (2d ed. 2009).
164. Second Draft Amended ACJHR Protocol, supra note 70, at art. 16.
165. Symposium, NGO Standing and Influence in Regional Human Rights
Courts and Commissions, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 911, 916 (2011).
166. Simon M. Weldehaimanot, Unlocking the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights, 2 J. AFR. & INT’L L. 167, 177 (2009); see also African Union,
Meeting of Government Experts and Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General on
Legal Matters, art. 16(f), Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7 (2012) (on file with author). A full
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structing individuals’ access to the court] was not an oversight
on the part of African States but a calculated decision; and that
it was repeated when an opportunity for revision appeared at167
tests to unwillingness of states.” African civil society organizations have expressed concern that supporters advanced jurisdictional expansion with a political agenda, rather than a
168
genuine impetus to promote accountability. Indeed, it would
seem that if AU leaders’ true goal is to promote accountability,
efforts should be directed to strengthening the ICC, which has
yet to issue its first judgment, and avoiding diversion of resources to an unformed institution.
That said, perhaps the most troubling reflection of inadequate political will for international accountability efforts is the
discouraging record of African states’ compliance with already
169
existing regional decisions at the state level. While Africa is
indeed a supporter of international justice—exemplified by the
fact that African states constitute the largest regional block of
170
ICC states parties —African states have repeatedly failed to
comply with regional human rights-related decisions. Indeed,
observers estimate that the rate of states’ full compliance with
171
AU Commission decisions is only fourteen percent.
Examples of non-compliance with other regional and subregional courts abound. In September 2009, Zimbabwe withdrew from the regional Southern African Development Community tribunal, in an apparent attempt to halt the effect of a
discussion of this aspect is beyond the scope of this paper.
167. Weldehaimanot, supra note 166, at 178.
168. Valentina Torricelli, The Contribution African States Can Make to the
ICC Review Conference, in OXFORD TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE RESEARCH: DEBATING INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA 30 (2010), available at http://www
.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Justice_in_ Africa.pdf.
169. Cf. Cavallaro & Brewer, supra note 142, at 770 (“[I]n states where respect for human rights is not entrenched, supranational tribunals are unlikely
to enjoy the automatic implementation of their decisions, particularly when
these decisions call for a significant political or financial commitment . . . .”).
For a study explaining the difficulty of determining the exact rate of compliance with African institutions, see Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, 1994 –2004, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 32 (2007) (“[T]he attempt to
chart compliance empirically and analytically is fraught with methodological
difficulties. The most important of these is the [African] Commission’s failure
to enunciate clear and specific remedies, leaving an unreliable yardstick for
measuring compliance.”).
170. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www
.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
171. Viljoen & Louw, supra note 169, at 1, 5.
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172

court judgment. The Gambia has delayed compliance with
the regional Economic Community of West African States
Court of Justice ruling to investigate the disappearance of a
173
journalist in 2006. According to a coalition of civil society organizations, Kenya and Uganda failed to comply with regional
East African Community Court of Justice rulings in 2006 and
174
2007. Several examples even reflect efforts to avoid accountability at the ICC. For example, after the ICC Office of the
Prosecutor announced an investigation in 2005 into abuses in
Sudan, the Sudanese government established the Special Crim175
inal Court for Events in Darfur (SCCD). The move was seen
as “window dressing” and critics found that the court held “lit176
tle promise of bringing justice to victims of serious abuses.”
In effect, expansion of the ACJHR’s jurisdiction could continue
to facilitate inaction by excluding key international actors from
ensuring compliance with individual criminal accountability efforts.
The issue of jurisdictional expansion is marked by serious
concerns relating to the ACJHR’s ability or the willingness of
its members to pursue investigations, conduct trials, and enforce judgments. Indeed, several aspects of an expanded court
are compelling, and supporters’ arguments communicate legitimate points about the trajectory of international justice. Ultimately, however, expanding the ACJHR’s jurisdiction as proposed threatens to hamper both its effectiveness and that of the
ICC. Determining a way forward requires critics to consider the
potential legitimacy of expansion while ensuring that such a
development would satisfy fair trial requirements.

172. Paidamoyo Muzulu, SADC Mulling Measures to Take Against Zimbabwe, ZIM. INDEP. (May 13, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201105140080
.html. The case at issue was Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd & Anor v. Republic of
Zimbabwe, Case No. SADCT: 2/07; see also Implications, supra note 78, at 19.
173. IFJ Calls on ECOWAS and Gambia to Enforce Court Ruling on Disappearance of Journalist 3 Years On, INT’L FED’N JOURNALISTS (Apr. 9, 2009),
http://africa.ifj.org/en/articles/ifj-calls-on-ecowas-and-gambia-to-enforce-courtruling-on-disappearance-of-journalist-3-years-on; see also Implications, supra
note 78, at 19.
174. See Implications, supra note 78, at 19.
175. Joanne Mariner, Bringing Justice to Darfur, CNN (June 24, 2005),
http://articles.cnn.com/ 2005-06-24/justice/mariner.darfur_1_janjaweed-darfursudanese-government/3?_s=PM:LAW.
176. Sudan: Khartoum War Crimes Investigations Are Mere ‘Window Dressing,’ HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/10/
20/sudan-khartoum-war-crimes-investigations-are-mere-window-dressing.
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III. MOVING FORWARD: PROPOSED STEPS IF THE AU
PURSUES ACJHR EXPANSION
Despite the legal and policy-based concerns outlined above,
resisting expansion of the ACJHR may be politically unpalatable (if not impossible), and doing so potentially risks ignoring
the legitimate purposes of such a development. Stakeholders
should engage with proposals to expand the court at an early
stage to ensure some level of input and guarantee that the ultimate result satisfies fair trial requirements.
A. RESISTING EXPANSION MAY PROVE IMPOSSIBLE OR
UNDESIRABLE
Jurisdictional expansion of the ACJHR as proposed is likely inadvisable due to the myriad legal and policy obstacles previously outlined. To now direct resources and expertise to a
new institution would be to withhold crucial support for a blossoming and increasingly robust ICC. In addition, the ACJHR as
initially proposed will likely have its hands full given the al177
ready unprecedented breadth of its jurisdictional scope.
That said, resisting expansion might well prove impossible.
While commentators have argued that AU opposition to the
178
ICC should not be overstated, it appears that African hostility to the ICC may be growing (or is at least more visible than in
179
the past). Indeed, AU leaders have already shown interest in
expanding the ACJHR’s jurisdiction, and political will may con180
tinue to further this agenda. Moreover, expansion may be desirable at a theoretical level and because of what it reflects
181
about the reality of developments in international law. The
historical trajectory of international legal jurisprudence suggests that the current bifurcated system distinguishing statelevel from individual-level proceedings may well evolve.
Although reasons exist to resist expansion, attempts by
rights groups and ICC proponents to resist expansion of the
ACJHR may prove unsuccessful. To ensure that complementa177. See supra notes 63–64, 69, 92 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Elise Keppler, Managing Setbacks for the International
Criminal Court in Africa, 56 J. AFR. L. 1, 1–8 (2012).
179. See, e.g., African Union Decision 245, supra note 66 (asserting that
AU member states need not “cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98
of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President Omar El Bashir of The Sudan”).
180. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part II.A.1.
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rity endures, stakeholders should help develop key benchmarks
against which the credibility and effectiveness of a new regional criminal-level court could be tested.
B. RECOMMENDED BENCHMARKS FOR AN EXPANDED REGIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT IN AFRICA
Calls to expand the ACJHR do not reflect the first or only
efforts to develop extra-ICC judicial mechanisms for crimes
within the mandate of the Rome Statute. Reference to past experiences and analysis of stakeholders’ recommendations relating to fair trial requirements elsewhere is instructive. As elsewhere, developing and applying key benchmarks can address
potential challenges posed by the expansion of ACJHR jurisdiction. Ultimately, many of these recommendations would apply,
not only to proceedings of an expanded ACJHR, but to any trial
of a person charged with a serious criminal offense.
ACJHR criminal prosecutions would have to be generally
182
credible in accordance with international standards. Indeed,
prosecutions for serious crimes are not only mandated under
international law, but are also meaningful for peace-building
183
and stability in post-conflict states. U.N. principles for the
protection and promotion of human rights state that a right to
justice means both “prompt, thorough, independent and impartial investigations” and “appropriate measures in respect of the
perpetrators, particularly in the area of criminal justice, by ensuring that those responsible for serious crimes under interna184
tional law are prosecuted, tried and duly punished.”
The
Rome Statute expressly asserts that non-ICC prosecutions
must reflect a state’s ability and willingness to meaningfully
prosecute a defendant for ICC jurists to consider them accepta185
ble domestic alternative proceedings.
Quite reasonably, the ICC would likely place a similar
182. Benchmarks for Assessing Possible National Alternatives to International Criminal Court Cases Against LRA Leaders (May 2007), in BENCHMARKS FOR JUSTICE FOR SERIOUS CRIMES IN NORTHERN UGANDA: HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH MEMORANDA ON JUSTICE STANDARDS AND THE JUBA PEACE
TALKS 3 (2008) [hereinafter Benchmarks], available at http://www.hrw.org/
legacy/pub/2008/ij/uganda_memos_cover.pdf.
183. Id. at 6.
184. Id. (quoting U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Human Rights Comm’n, Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights
through Action to Combat Impunity, princ. 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/
Add.1, 61st Sess. (Feb. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Impunity Principles]).
185. Id.; see generally Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 17.
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onus on a regional court. The thresholds of willingness and
186
ability entail both substantive and procedural requirements.
Procedurally, investigations and prosecutions must be both independent and impartial. Proceedings must not shield the accused from criminal responsibility and must be consistent with
187
intent to bring a person to justice. Substantively, drafters
should incorporate Rome Statute crime definitions and legal
theories, such as command responsibility, into the law of the
188
expanded court. Indeed, if an expanded ACJHR emerges with
the flexibility to create its own rules and procedures—an origin
far different from a more conventional situation of rule-of-law
building in which existing domestic judicial systems are shaped
189
to comply with international standards —there is little basis
to argue that its jurisdictional definitions should differ from
those embedded in the Rome Statute. A failure to incorporate
and apply Rome Statute definitions could result in a single defendant’s simultaneous trials before the ICC and the expanded
ACJHR with very similar (though not identical) charges, impli190
cating the principle of ne bis in idem. Similarly, the expanded
ACJHR should expressly guarantee that the complementarity
191
regime with the ICC would be fully respected. Such a move
would assure opponents of expansion that the ACJHR was created for a purpose greater than avoiding ICC accountability.
186. Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 6.
187. Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 17; Benchmarks, supra note 182,
at 6.
188. See African Union, Report of the Meeting of Ministers of Justice
and/or Attorneys General on Legal Matters 6 (May 14–15, 2012) (on file with
author); cf. Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 6 (noting, in discussion of a potential alternative to ICC prosecution in the domestic Ugandan legal system, that
the Rome Statute requires the substantive incorporation of crimes within its
mandate into states parties’ internal law).
189. The principle of complementarity does not depend, however, on the
incorporation of Rome Statute definitions into domestic law. For a case to be
considered inadmissible before the ICC, a national prosecution must proceed
against the same defendant for the same conduct, though the label applied to
that crime may differ. See Nidal Nabil Jurdi, Some Lessons on Complementarity for the International Criminal Court Review Conference, 34 S. AFR. Y.B.
INT’L L. 28, 35–37 (2009), available at http:// ssrn.com/ abstract=1651851.
190. For a definition of this principle, see Erdei, supra note 146, at 319–20.
See also Report 9, supra note 146, at 7–8 (discussing a situation where the existence of parallel legal structures resulted in a Kosovar Serb being twice indicted and tried for an alleged murder).
191. Recommendations of the African and European Civil Society Seminar
on Accountability and Justice, 11–12 April 2011—Pretoria, South Africa, INT’L
FED. HUM. RTS., http://fidh.org/IMG/pdf/EU_Seminar_recommendations_
Summary_English_2.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
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Ultimately, the issue of credibility is particularly salient in the
context of Africa, where a proliferation of judicial institutions
has been accompanied by the continuation of egregious human
rights violations. Supporters of an expanded court should
acknowledge doubts over African leaders’ commitment to justice for serious international crimes and directly address such
concerns.
The observation of internationally recognized fair trial
standards is closely related to the issue of credibility. The expanded ACJHR should rigorously observe internationally recognized fair trial standards in principle and in practice. These
standards are reflected in the ICCPR and include, but are not
limited to, the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhu192
man, or degrading treatment; the right to a presumption of
innocence; the right to adequate time and facilities for preparation of a defense; the right to a trial without undue delay; the
right to legal assistance; the right to an interpreter; and the
193
right to refrain from self-incrimination. Particular attention
should be paid to ensure the proper scope and adequacy of dis194
closure of material to the defense. The ACJHR should also
provide for adequate investigative and prosecutorial capacity,
implement witness protection and support procedures, develop
a plan for victims’ participation and reparations, guarantee the
security of court personnel and participants, and execute out195
reach programs across the continent. These elements are particularly important to ensure adequate involvement of the defense, the prosecution, the judiciary, and the public—all vital
parties in efforts to counter impunity. A failure to adequately
assess and develop any component could jeopardize the integrity of the whole.
Perhaps most importantly, the expanded ACJHR should
take steps to ensure that its judiciary is properly qualified. All
too often, governments appoint judges to international tribunals paying little attention to nominees’ criminal law creden196
tials. Indeed, achieving the goal of a truly qualified judiciary
192. ICCPR, supra note 30, at art. 7; Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 8.
193. ICCPR, supra note 30, at art. 14; Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 8.
194. Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 8.
195. Particular Challenges for Uganda in Conducting National Trials for
Serious Crimes (Sept. 2007), in BENCHMARKS FOR JUSTICE FOR SERIOUS
CRIMES IN NORTHERN UGANDA: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH MEMORANDA ON JUSTICE STANDARDS AND THE JUBA PEACE TALKS, supra note 182, at 30–33 (2008)
[hereinafter Particular Challenges].
196. See RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES:
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may be best served by maintaining the institutional bifurcation
outlined above in detail. That is, the AU could proceed with the
creation of a separate regional court concerned solely with individual crimes, thus benefiting from the specialization in function and training such a court would attract, while maintaining
the current dual-prong structure of the current and unexpanded ACJHR. Meeting fair trial standards generally will demand
the commitment of the judiciary and the broader public, alike.
As noted above, the absence of a generalized respect for the judiciary has already hampered accountability efforts across the
197
continent. Undertaking broad efforts to raise the profile of respect for judicial decisions in Africa will be crucial to operationalize fair trial standards. Ultimately, however, fair trials will
require not only a legal system of high quality, but also that
198
system’s independence from outside political forces.
This
challenge may prove particularly onerous given the politically
charged atmosphere in which the suggestion of jurisdictional
expansion emerged.
In addition, penalties applied through an expanded
ACJHR should reflect the gravity of the serious international
199
crimes in its mandate. International law requires that states
not only prosecute, but also punish, perpetrators of serious
200
human rights abuses. The Convention Against Torture, for
example, states that the crimes it concerns should be “punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their
201
grave nature.” U.N. principles on fighting impunity note that
states should ensure that convicted perpetrators of serious
202
crimes are “duly punished.” Truth commissions and traditional justice mechanisms may well play an important role in
post-conflict justice processes for some offenses, but an expandPRINCIPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS 173–74 (2010) (“It is apparent that efforts
to insulate ICC elections from politicized electoral practices have largely
failed, so that selection to both the ICJ and ICC is seen as being part of a
broader landscape of political elections, often with very limited regard for the
judicial nature of the posts.”).
197. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
198. Particular Challenges, supra note 195, at 29–30.
199. Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 9–10.
200. See Brad Emmons, Note, Tortured Language: “Individuals,” Corporate
Liability, and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 96 MINN. L. REV. 675, 683
(2011).
201. Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 16 (quoting Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, at
art. 4, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984)).
202. Impunity Principles, supra note 184, at princ. 1.
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ed ACJHR should adhere to global standards and resist pressures to implement these mechanisms exclusively. As in other
international and hybrid international-national criminal
courts, an expanded ACJHR should impose imprisonment as its
203
principal penalty.
International and hybrid internationalnational institutions do not permit the death penalty as a sen204
tence for serious international crimes and, to meet international fair trial standards, the expanded ACJHR should do the
same. In addition, imposed and served periods of imprisonment
should reflect the seriousness of crimes. International tribunals
have consistently applied terms reflecting the gravity of the
atrocities of which they are seized. A 2002 study concluded, for
example, that the mean ICTY sentence was for 16 years’ imprisonment, while the majority of ICTR sentences were for life
205
imprisonment.
Finally, the expanded ACJHR should explicitly recognize
that judicial determinations of ICC admissibility rest, under
206
Article 19 of the Rome Statute, exclusively with ICC judges.
That is, the ACJHR’s underlying documents should explicitly
recognize that a determination of admissibility under the Rome
Statute is not subject to attack on the grounds of competing
ACJHR jurisdiction. Perhaps the best way to ensure the courts’
compatibility is to help guide an expanded ACJHR to work
with—not against—ICC proceedings. For example, the AU
could ensure that an expanded ACJHR adds value (rather than
creates redundancy) by deploying it to execute proceedings
against mid- and lower-level defendants where the ICC has
commenced investigation and prosecutions against their supe207
rior counterparts. That said, regardless of the way in which it
is safeguarded, true complementarity must remain a pivotal element of the ICC.
CONCLUSION
Somewhat compelling in theory, jurisdictional expansion of
the ACJHR faces myriad legal and practical obstacles. Propo203. Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 9.
204. Benchmarks, supra note 182, at 9.
205. Mark A. Drumbl & Kenneth S. Gallant, Sentencing Policies and Practices in the International Criminal Tribunals, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 140, 142
(2002).
206. See Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 19.
207. See Williams & Schabas, supra note 128, at 620 (noting that drafters
intended the ICC to have a primary “emphasis” on senior leaders in any given
situation under investigation).
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nents of expansion should revisit the reasons asserted in support of including serious international crimes within the ambit
of the ACJHR and recognize that such goals are better served
by upholding the already-established ICC. Obfuscating jurisdictional boundaries between institutions risks compromising
the ICC’s substantial accomplishments and the ACJHR’s potential to contribute to Africa’s international jurisprudential
landscape. Ultimately, however, expansion of the ACJHR and
its overlap with the ICC may be seen as both politically palatable and the result of organically evolving international law.
Should demands to expand jurisdiction become more insistent,
stakeholders must develop benchmarks to preserve the integrity of the ICC and ensure the legitimacy of the expanded
ACJHR. Failing to do so would compromise the effectiveness
and the credibility of both institutions, compromising hard-won
advances in international human rights law.

